Why is it so difficult to end international rivalry? Under the first thematic area of my research, I concentrate on investigating this question, placing a specific emphasis on public opinion. Attaining public support is particularly important for a leader seeking peace with an international adversary. It serves to convey credible signals of concessions to the international counterpart and provides a means to withstand the political backlash from opposing coalitions at the domestic level. Yet, as evidenced by the failed attempts at rapprochement between the US and Iran, North and South Korea, and Turkey and Greece, selling peace to citizens who hold on to a strong enemy image of the international adversary appears challenging. Acknowledging this reality, my research explores the social and psychological barriers that hinder individuals from supporting peace at the domestic and international levels. Currently, I am engaged in three projects that align with this theme, one of which being my doctoral dissertation.
1-1. Dissertation Project: Competitive Political Environments and Public Opinion on Rapprochement
My dissertation project investigates how political conflicts and cooperation that extend beyond a rivalry dyad affect public attitudes towards a foreign adversary and rapprochement. To explain public opinion on interstate peace, an extensive body of literature has concentrated on studying the characteristics of actors and behaviors observed within international rivalries. Nevertheless, focusing solely on factors intrinsic to a rivalry pair might cause us to neglect the reality that individuals are frequently exposed to varying levels of competition involving political entities outside of the bilateral dimension. To address this significant void, my dissertation investigates the impact of political competition at both international and domestic levels—specifically characterized by ally-enemy polarization and partisan polarization—on public opinion on peace between international rivals.
My research demonstrates that citizens are more inclined to endorse peace initiatives in a less polarized environment because a diminished ``us versus them'' cognitive framework fosters a less pronounced perception of the foreign adversary's enemy image. First, I argue that interstate behaviors involving third-party states can diminish negative perceptions of a foreign adversary when they reduce tensions between states belonging to ally and enemy groups. While building the theoretical claim, I introduce the International Social Image Model (ISIM), which explains how individuals factor in the observed interstate behaviors when updating their perceptions of international images. By conducting multiple simulations using the ISIM, I identify that enhanced cooperation between a primary rival and an ally state, as well as between a secondary enemy and an ally state, reduces the inclination to view the rival state as an enemy, thereby increasing public support for peace. In the second part of my dissertation, I turn to political competition in the domestic arena, specifically investigating the impact of partisan polarization on public attitudes towards rapprochement. I argue for a negative correlation between the intensity of partisan polarization and domestic support for peace initiatives. This theoretical proposition is grounded in the notion that individuals who observe divisions within their nation are more inclined to support policies that promote unity within their own country while perceiving a heightened sense of national vulnerability to external threats.
I support my theory using a multi-method research strategy that pieces together experimental and observational evidence. First, to examine a causal linkage between polarization-leading events and public support for rapprochement, I administer three distinct survey experiments cross-nationally in the United States and South Korea. In these experiments, I prime political polarization by using creative treatments that consist of actual visualized content that enables an authentic representation of how people engage with and respond in a real-world setting. Second, specifically to test my hypotheses at the international level, I employ supervised machine-learning methods on a large text corpus of more than 1.4 million tweets from South Korean and Taiwan users. By analyzing these texts, I examine how the dramatic US-DPRK interactions between 2017 and 2018 influenced anti-rival attitudes in South Korea and Taiwan towards their respective adversaries, North Korea and China.
1-2. Reciprocated Cooperation and Public Opinion on an International Rival
In a paper, titled “How Reciprocated Cooperation Shapes Public Opinion on an International Rival: Evidence from a Panel Survey in South Korea,” I investigate the impact of reciprocated cooperation between international rivals on reducing threat perceptions of the adversary. The paper argues that cooperation based on reciprocity does not necessarily ensure public support for peace because its threat-mitigating impact largely hinges on how individuals socially identify the two main speakers of peace – their incumbent leader and the rival state. To test my argument, I construct empirical evidence by combining two datasets: a three-wave panel survey carried out by the South Korean government in 2018 and the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS). The findings were consistent with my theoretical expectations. The extent to which North Korea’s cooperative actions reduced antagonism depended largely on the strength of South Korean respondents’ ideological attachment and policy endorsement to their incumbent leadership, as well as their identification of North Korea as the same ethnic or national group. Also, among those who viewed the incumbent government and North Korea as social outgroups, the rival’s olive branch led to a domestic backlash by intensifying skeptical outlooks on inter-Korean relations and national security environments. This project is currently under review.
1-3. Multilateral Engagement, Authoritarianism, and the US-China Rivalry
In a paper with coauthors (Xin Han and Shuli Zhang), titled “Multilateral Engagement, Authoritarianism, and Threat Perception of China,” I examine the impact of China’s increasing multilateral engagement on the extent to which Americans perceive the country as a threat. We argue that, when primed with the growing authoritarianism in China, the threat-mitigating effects of its multilateral engagement may significantly diminish because the priming information leads people to interpret China’s cooperative behaviors not as a sign of integration into the existing liberal international system but as an attempt to challenge it from within. Our survey experiment results support this argument. Americans solely exposed to a written report on China’s contribution to IGOs show reduced threat perceptions of China. However, these threat-mitigating effects diminish significantly for those who have first watched a news video clip highlighting recent China’s authoritarian behaviors. Even more, under authoritarian priming, China’s IGO engagement triggers a backfire effect by reinforcing the perceived threats from China. This project is currently under review.
What are the domestic consequences of enduring rivalry? My second research area revolves around exploring this puzzle, with a specific focus on political behaviors in democratic countries. As evident in the rivalries between the US-China, the EU-Russia, and North-South Korea, ideological competition between democracy and autocracy is a defining feature of major interstate confrontations. My research is centered on examining how escalating tensions between these countries influence citizens’ understanding of democracy and their behavioral adherence to democratic values and principles. I believe that this approach is unique and important as it investigates the cause of the erosion of democracy, not within the domestic political realm, but rather from the influence of the international arena.
2-1. Authoritarian Threats and Civic Understanding of Democracy
In a coauthored paper (with Iza Ding), titled “The Rise of Authoritarian Threats and Democratic Backsliding,” I investigate the impact of growing influence and threats from authoritarian countries like China on the deterioration of democracy. Citizens understand democracy not only as a set of values and practices but also as a fundamental aspect of their citizenship. We argue that the rising authoritarian threats can be portrayed as posing a status threat to democratic citizens’ national identity, leading them to associate democracy more strongly with their citizenship rather than its values or practices. As a result, we propose that democratic citizens, when confronted with foreign authoritarian threats, may become more tolerant of their leaders’ disregard for democratic principles, potentially contributing to domestic democratic erosion. We will test our theoretical claims by conducting survey experiments cross-nationally in the United States and South Korea. The data collection for this project is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2023, which is funded by the Evelyn and Thomas Rawski Graduate Student/Faculty Partnership Grant in China Studies from the Asian Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh.
2-2. Party Name, Authoritarian Rivals, and Foreign Policy Competence
In a coauthored paper (with Matthias Avina), titled “Democratic Party Name and Foreign Policy Competence against Authoritarian Rivals,” I study how party names that contain words associated with democratic values affect the public’s perception of the political party’s foreign policy effectiveness. We argue that the adoption of democratic party names serves as an important heuristic, priming voters to link the party with democratic principles and reinforcing its ownership over the relevant issues. Once voters associate a party with democratic values, it is expected that their endorsement of the party’s foreign policy performance will increase, especially when it comes to safeguarding national security against the threats posed by authoritarian adversaries. We will test these arguments through a survey experiment in South Korea, taking advantage of the historical use of a particular democratic terminology in the names of both conservative and liberal parties. The experimental design has received approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh, and data collection for this project is set to conclude by the upcoming Fall in South Korea. This project is funded by the POSCO Research Grant in Korean Studies from the Asian Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh.
My final research theme focuses on the consequences of external interventions in civil wars. Throughout my doctoral journey, I have developed a deep understanding of the gravity of interstate conflicts, given their rising prevalence and detrimental impact on human rights and the functioning of democratic systems. With this keen awareness, I collaborate with colleagues studying civil wars to examine the effects of third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts, particularly through an interaction with my two other focused subjects: international rivalry and democracy.
3-1. Multi-party Intervention, International Rivalry, and Civil War Duration
In a coauthored paper (with Merve Keskin), “When Does the Number Matter?: Multi-party Intervention, Bargaining Failures, and Civil War Duration,” I study the conditions under which multi-party interventions are more strongly associated with the duration of civil wars. Previous research has indicated that as the number of intervening countries increases, civil wars are more prone to extend due to the potential emergence of bargaining failures caused by information and commitment problems. We argue that the number’s effect can be heterogeneous: when intervening states are positioned more competitively between two warring parties, like two-sided and rivalry intervention, an increased number of interveners is more likely to result in bargaining failures and civil war extension. We test our arguments by employing multiple datasets on civil wars and third-party interventions. The results show that, compared to other types of multi-party interventions, the rivalry intervention intensifies the number’s adverse effect on the probability of peace agreement by at least 25% and its positive impact on the duration of civil war by at least 21%.
3-2. Democratic Intervention and Rebel Election
In a coauthored paper (with Hyunjung Park), titled “External Source of Ballots in Civil War: Democratic Intervention and Rebel Election,” I examine the impact of third-party interventions and the regime types of the intervening countries on the tendency of rebel groups to conduct elections during civil wars. Unlike previous research that primarily explores the reasons for rebel elections from the perspective of increasing rebel groups’ legitimacy, our focus is on the external origin of rebel ballots. We argue that external support provided by democratic countries can enhance the likelihood of rebel elections through the principal-agent and learning mechanisms. To test our theoretical claims, we employ multiple observational datasets. Consistent with our expectations, the democratic levels of external supporters are positively associated with rebel elections: among the rebel groups receiving external support, an increase of one level in the Polity score of intervening countries results in a 2.39% higher probability of conducting elections.
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